The comparative neuroprimatology 2018 (CNP-2018) road map for research on How the Brain Got Language by Arbib, Michael A et al.
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2018
The comparative neuroprimatology 2018 (CNP-2018) road map for research
on How the Brain Got Language
Arbib, Michael A; Aboitiz, Francisco; Burkart, Judith M; Corballis, Michael C; Coudé, Gino; Hecht,
Erin; Liebal, Katja; Myowa-Yamakoshi, Masako; Pustejovsky, James; Putt, Shelby S; Rossano,
Federico; Russon, Anne E; Schoenemann, P Thomas; Seifert, Uwe; Semendeferi, Katerina; Sinha, Chris;
Stout, Dietrich; Volterra, Virginia; Wacewicz, Slawomir; Wilson, Benjamin
Abstract: We present a new road map for research on “How the Brain Got Language” that adopts
an EvoDevoSocio perspective and highlights comparative neuroprimatology – the comparative study of
brain, behavior and communication in extant monkeys and great apes – as providing a key grounding for
hypotheses on the last common ancestor of humans and monkeys (LCA-m) and chimpanzees (LCA-c)
and the processes which guided the evolution LCA-m → LCA-c → protohumans → H. sapiens. Such
research constrains and is constrained by analysis of the subsequent, primarily cultural, evolution of H.
sapiens which yielded cultures involving the rich use of language.
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-151873
Akzeptierte Version
Originally published at:
Arbib, Michael A; Aboitiz, Francisco; Burkart, Judith M; Corballis, Michael C; Coudé, Gino; Hecht,
Erin; Liebal, Katja; Myowa-Yamakoshi, Masako; Pustejovsky, James; Putt, Shelby S; Rossano, Federico;
Russon, Anne E; Schoenemann, P Thomas; Seifert, Uwe; Semendeferi, Katerina; Sinha, Chris; Stout,
Dietrich; Volterra, Virginia; Wacewicz, Slawomir; Wilson, Benjamin (2018). The comparative neuropri-
matology 2018 (CNP-2018) road map for research on How the Brain Got Language. Interaction Studies
: Social Behaviour and Communication in Biological and Artificial Systems, 19(1/2):371-388.
The Comparative Neuroprimatology 2018 (CNP-2018) Road Map  
for Research on How the Brain Got Language 
To Appear in a special 2018 double issue of Interaction Studies 19(1-2) on 
How the Brain Got Language: Towards a New Road Map 
Edited by Michael A. Arbib 
Michael A. Arbib; Francisco Aboitiz; Judith M. Burkart; Michael Corballis; Gino Coudé; Erin 
Hecht; Katja Liebal; Masako Myowa-Yamakoshi; James Pustejovsky; Shelby Putt; Federico 
Rossano; Anne E. Russon; P. Thomas Schoenemann; Uwe Seifert; Katerina Semendeferi; Chris 
Sinha; Dietrich Stout; Virginia Volterra; Sławomir Wacewicz; and Benjamin Wilson 
Abstract: 
We present a new road map for research on “How the Brain Got Language” that adopts an 
EvoDevoSocio perspective and highlights comparative neuroprimatology – the comparative 
study of brain, behavior and communication in extant monkeys and great apes – as providing a 
key grounding for hypotheses on the last common ancestor of humans and monkeys (LCA-m) 
and chimpanzees (LCA-c) and the processes which guided the evolution LCA-m → LCA-c → 
protohumans → H. sapiens. Such research constrains and is constrained by analysis of the 
subsequent, primarily cultural, evolution of H. sapiens which yielded cultures involving the rich 
use of language. 
An Overall Perspective 
The present paper presents the Comparative Neuroprimatology 2018 (CNP-2018) Road Map 
based on the papers of this Special Issue of Interaction Studies on “How the Brain Got 
Language: Towards a New Road Map.” The “comparative neuroprimatology” framework for 
study of language evolution assesses relevant data and theories concerning the brains, 
behaviors and communication systems of monkeys, apes and humans to raise hypotheses 
about LCA-m (our last common ancestor with monkeys) and LCA-c (our last common ancestor 
with chimpanzees and apes more generally) as a basis for investigating the biological and 
cultural evolution of the human language-ready brain.  
Four assumptions are shared by the authors of this road map (though several may remain 
controversial in the language evolution community at large): 
(1) Our ancestors evolved a capability for protolanguage—which had an open lexicon but 
little if any syntax—before they developed language. Here, “protolanguage” is being used in the 
sense of “something intermediate between (i) the communication systems of LCA-c and (ii) 
language – but which is not itself a language.” 
(2) The quest is an exercise in EvoDevoSocio – the view that biological evolution defines 
developmental systems that can both shape and be shaped by cultural evolution, the dynamic 
emergence of habits of social interaction. We seek to understand how biological evolution 
yielded brains and bodies (Evo) that could develop (Devo) in a culture that already had 
(proto)language (Socio) so that children could master the use of that language with the help of 
caregivers to support (proto)language acquisition. And how did these brains enable humans in 
interaction to support the (extended and polymorphic) emergence of languages followed in 
turn by historical language change? 
(3) The study of language evolution must include brain mechanisms, comparing human brain 
imaging and lesion data with data on brain mechanisms for “language-related” functions in 
other species to ground an understanding of what has been conserved and what has been 
changed in human brain evolution. However, “language-related” functions are not only 
communicative. 
(4) Shared mechanisms that support signed as well as spoken languages are crucial. 
Nonetheless, the importance of spoken language requires us to understand the evolution of 
human vocal control. 
Evolution works by bricolage (tinkering). It does not produce the optimal software on the 
optimal hardware. Instead, it yields a cultural artifact riddled with historical contingency on a 
brain whose genetic code reflects selection without conscious design operating on structures 
(DNA, membrane and cytoplasm) that are far removed from what we might think are the 
crucial design features of language. To understand the evolution of the language-ready brain 
we need to understand mechanisms and processes and their variation across (at least) 
primates. Just because processes have the same name (e.g., imitation, pantomime, cognition, 
theory of mind) does not mean that they are implemented by the same circuits across species 
or even in one brain.  
To keep references to a minimum, we place the name of each author in bold italics to refer 
the reader to their individual papers in this special issue (listed in the bibliography, which 
provides names of any co-authors) for detailed references. 
Aspects of Language to be Explained 
We start by listing some key properties shared by human languages. 
Language is a Special Form of Communication 
Lexicon and Grammar  
A language provides a framework for sharing of meaning in a community by combining 
words (we use the term to include, e.g., the signs of a signed language), perhaps modifying the 
words in the process, to express both familiar and novel meanings and to understand (more or 
less) the novel utterances of others (parity of comprehension and production). It combines an 
open-ended lexicon with a rich grammar that supports a compositional semantics. 
The Endless Aboutness of Language 
A human language is a mechanism to support sharing of meaning in a community about 
physical and mental worlds. Components of this ability include: 
Here-and-Now: A commonly shared assumption is that the primary drive in the evolutionary 
path to language was the value of being able to coordinate current behavior, with joint 
attention supporting the sharing of perception of the current environment and plans for acting 
within that environment (Common Ground).  
Theory of mind: The ability to talk about the mental (including emotional) states of others; 
this may rest on an ability, possibly shared to some extent with other species, to infer the 
mental states of others, and use these to predict behavior.  
Displacement: Moving beyond the co-situated context, language builds on capacities for 
episodic memory, planning and imagination to support the ability to talk about distant events 
as well as about the past and the possible future, as well as counterfactuals. 
Abstraction: Moving from embodied grounding to disembodied abstractions.  
Language as a tool for thought versus language as a means of communication: 
Communicative tools are already tools for thought. Directing the goal/intention of a linguistic 
expression reflectively can be seen as self-communication, the origin of the alleged “non-
communicative” aspect of language.  
Social structure and the motivation to converse 
A prominent question at the workshop was “Why do we talk?” but a more fruitful question is 
“Why do we converse?” (i) In few species of nonhuman primates does communication involves 
a back and forth, whereas the dominant form of non-written language is conversation. (ii) The 
word “talk” overemphasizes the use of speech. The OED definition of conversation includes a 
quote from Boswell’s Life of Johnson (ed. 2, 1793) that cites Johnson as saying “we had talk 
enough, but no conversation; there was nothing discussed.” This stresses the importance of the 
endeavor to develop a shared mental understanding, and this seems to require some aspects of 
theory of mind. 
The motivation to converse is one linkage between emotion and language. Here we can note 
two further aspects: An utterance may be emotionally charged by the way in which prosody, 
facial expression and posture are integrated with its production – compare the power of music 
to sway the emotions. However, language can also express emotions without the speaker or 
signer being emotionally engaged, with emotion serving as just another domain for 
“aboutness.” 
Action, Gesture and Language 
Human languages are in most cases spoken languages (though their reach is extended by the 
emergence of writing), but the languages of the Deaf are fully-formed languages which rely on 
manual signs (supplemented, e.g., by facial expressions) and make no use of voice. When 
people do speak, their speech is complemented by cospeech gestures of the hands as well as 
facial expressions. The puzzle is this: Nonhuman primates exhibit very little in the way of vocal 
control but do exhibit dexterous manual control. Why, then, did vocal control evolve as part of 
the human brain’s distinctive capabilities, since language could “manage without it”? And how 
relevant does manual action remain in understanding the brain mechanisms of language? 
The notion, in any case, is that the brain mechanisms supporting language can – to a first 
approximation -- be separated from the mechanisms that recognize words in the sensory 
(auditory or visual) input and generate words in the motor (vocal or manual) output – without 
denying that neural plasticity will differentially restructure the brain dependent on whether 
language is spoken or signed – just as literacy can restructure it (Dehaene et al., 2010).  
Methodologies 
At the cost of some redundancy, we precede our specification of the new road map by 
illustrating a range of methodologies relevant to it. 
Neurophysiology and Comparative Neuroanatomy 
At a gross level, neuroanatomy characterizes distinctive brain regions and the pathways 
connecting them. At a finer level, it may seek to distinguish the cell types of different regions 
and the patterns of connectivity within and across those regions. Comparative neuroanatomy 
can thus suggest hypotheses about the evolutionary relationship of brains of LCA-m, LCA-c and 
modern humans, enriched by suggestions concerning the functions of specific regions. 
Aboitiz compares the anatomy of macaque and human brains in seeking to assess how 
changing connectivity might have supported the emergence of an auditory working memory 
(WM) that could provide the “phonological loop” for language. The reference point is that 
macaques have good visual WM but poor auditory WM. 
Hecht focuses on connectivity using diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) in living brains to compare 
pathways engaged in visuomotor integration may vary across macaque, chimpanzee and 
human, while discussing the importance of changes in mechanisms of plasticity in 
complementing the “innate ground plan” of each brain. (Unfortunately, new NIH policies may 
preclude further US studies of DTI for great apes.) Semendeferi increases the level of detail by 
staining brains of different primates to reveal changes in neuronal structure that underlie 
differences in the substructure of different nuclei, especially those related to emotion. 
Neurophysiology then enriches the comparative database by looking at the dynamic activity 
of the brain while the human or animal performs specific tasks. In monkeys, we have data on 
the fine structure of firing of individual neurons in a circuit. In humans, we have imaging 
techniques that can follow fine timing with very poor spatial resolution (e.g., EEG) or coarse 
timing with better spatial resolution (but still in terms of millions of neurons as the unit, e.g., 
fMRI). 
Coudé uses neurophysiology to explore detailed activity of neurons, and especially mirror 
neurons in the manual and orofacial regions of region F5 of macaque prefrontal cortex and, 
crucially, links this to neuroanatomy showing that these two regions are linked to very different 
subsystems of the macaque brain. 
Wilson use neurophysiology on sequence processing in the macaque brain to assess what is 
conserved in the human brain and what additions may have evolved to support syntax. 
Behavior, Social Structure and Communication 
Both field studies and studies in the lab can provide useful information for our quest even in 
the absence of neural correlates. Different species differ not only in their behavior and 
communication but also in the social structure in which these are embedded. Exploring the 
relationship between social structure and forms of communication may help us better 
distinguish the evolution of “social support for extensive communication” from the evolution of 
the general form of language (lexicon, grammar, compositional semantics) on which cultural 
evolution has played extensive variations – without ignoring the eventual need to explore the 
interactions between these two evolutionary foci. 
Liebal surveys gestures, calls and facial expressions in nonhuman primates to question the 
view that gestures are intentional whereas facial expressions and vocalizations are emotional. 
This may accord with a broader theoretical assessment of the linkage between emotion and 
intentions, and the observation that what distinguishes vervet alarm calls is not emotion (each 
expresses a fearful situation) but rather the difference between eagle, snake and leopard. 
Burkart notes that callitrichid monkeys (e.g., marmosets) appear to exhibit particularly 
elaborate vocal communication, including vocal turn-taking. She explores the hypothesis that 
this is linked with cooperative breeding (i.e. infant care shared among group members). Among 
primates, this rearing system is correlated with proactive prosociality, which can be expressed 
as a motivation to share information. Since humans are the only cooperative breeders in 
primates besides callitrichids, cooperative breeding may contribute to understanding why 
language evolved in our species, rather than in any other primate. 
Rossano uses comparative study of social manipulation, turn-taking and cooperation in apes 
to develop implications for the evolution of language-based interaction in humans – but note 
the emphasis here on social conditions for such interactions, not the particularities of language 
as distinct from other forms of social competition and cooperation. Importantly, he further 
stresses the need for longitudinal studies to explore the emergence of different gestures in 
apes in comparison with language development in children.  
Both imitation and pantomime have figured in discussions of the relation between action 
and language. Russon analyzes imitation in orangutans and offers evidence that they have 
some form of pantomime and that its use does not involve imitation. Myowa compares 
imitation in chimpanzees and young children to assess their different styles of imitation, noting 
that chimpanzees attend to the hands of the imitatee while children also glance back and forth 
at facial expression. The key lesson is that the same term may be employed for an ape and a 
human capacity but that there may be differences that require an evolutionary explanation. 
Volterra focuses on humans, revealing a developmental progression from actions via 
gestures to “words” (whether signed or spoken). Does this support the hypothesis of an 
evolutionary progression from manual action via gesture to protolanguage? The answer will 
require a delicate treatment of the relation between phylogeny and ontogeny.  
Corballis offers a comparative perspective (not limited to primates) of episodic memory, 
broadly construed, to suggest an evolutionary basis for a key property of language, 
displacement. 
Archeology 
Archeology asks what can be learned from the remains of protohumans (australopithecines 
and predecessors of sapiens in the genus Homo) and early humans and their artefacts. New 
findings about Neandertal culture are further enriching the database. Here, the primates with 
whom modern humans being compared are all extinct hominins rather than extant apes or 
monkeys. 
Schoenemann focuses in part on the sparse set of skulls of Australopithecus and Homo and 
the somewhat limited inference of relative size of different cortical regions from endocasts of 
the skulls whose indentations are indicative of gross cortical shape. 
Cognitive archeology examines “cultural remains” of the daily lives of our ancestors to 
hypothesize the cognitive processes involved in their making and use. Stout and Putt carry this 
further, employing “neuro-archeology” – they teach modern humans to make stone tools of the 
kind found by archeologists; see what parts and connections of the brain are “exercised” by 
learning the ancient skill; and hypothesize that their enlargement may have been a step in brain 
evolution. 
High-Level Theory 
Diverse “high-level” theoretical approaches may complement attempts to generate and 
directly address the data of comparative neuroprimatology.  
Wacewicz offers an approach more consonant with general evolutionary theory to 
complement the work of Burkart and Rossano by emphasizing trust, cooperation and turn-
taking in language origins. 
Sinha offers a general EvoDevoSocio perspective that highlights the role of biological and 
cultural co-evolution, with particular emphasis on the evolution of praxis, symbols and infancy. 
Seifert exemplifies a broader assessment of culture-readiness by investigating what is and is 
not shared between music-readiness (more attuned to emotional expression?) and language-
readiness (more attuned to propositional content?). 
Modeling and Mechanism 
Pustejovsky probes the relation between action, perception and language, taking a step 
toward modeling the actual mechanisms that may underlie the use of language. 
Arbib 1 (2018a) introduces explicit modeling of biologically plausible neural networks, 
including frontoparietal interactions in macaque brain for the control of grasping, development 
of mirror neurons for manual actions, and opportunistic scheduling of sequences of actions. He 
then suggests how macaque mechanisms could be augmented to supply a hypothetical model 
of the ape brain adequate to support the emergence of novel gestures through dyadic 
interaction. 
Arbib 2 (2018b) offers a complementary style of modeling, schema theory, that can be 
applied to other primates but is especially relevant when modeling human capabilities such as 
visual scene understanding and language use for which data on activity at the neural level is 
sparse or unavailable. He models the “aboutness” of language in comprehension and 
production, and develops hypotheses about the evolutionary relation between manual action 
and language. 
Genetics 
Genetics lies outside the scope of the present roadmap, and thus is of high priority for its 
sequels. Note the distinction between finding genes that act “merely” as markers (these 
remains are sapiens, those are Neandertal – but even these may be relevant to establishing 
timelines) and those that can be linked to changing functionality of brain or body. One clear 
target is the assessment of how different forms of neural plasticity may have evolved to provide 
circuits with novel capacities for learning.  
Road Map Preliminaries 
Using the term “hominin” for genera that emerged after the split from the great apes 
(australopithecines, Homo), with “hominid” including the great apes as well, we base the 
evolutionary account on four (probably overlapping) stages. Each subsequent stage raises the 
question: What is new here, and how did it build on or depart from features of the previous 
stage? 
LCA-m. Database: Monkeys. 
LCA-c. Database: Modern great apes (thus Russon’s suggestion that LCA-ga would be a better 
term). 
After LCA-c. Database: Hominin fossil record up to c. 200 Kya 
Modern Homo sapiens. Database: Archeology since c. 200Kya, historical record and current 
observation 
We briefly summarize key “landmarks” and “connecting roads” for these stages but do not 
provide references for the details. Instead, we mark items MSH if they are part of the mirror 
system hypothesis as set forth in Arbib (2012), and present the name of the author in bold 
italics if they have discussed this item in this special issue. Areas of disagreement help define 
key challenges for future research. Since the length of the paper is limited, key points are 
omitted. but we aim to provide a firm framework for future elaboration. 
Since the body of actual and future research on each stage is overwhelming, the meta-
challenge is to assess what it is at each stage that may be relevant to understanding “how the 
brain got language.” For example, if we view speech as the sine qua non for language, we might 
focus on monkey calls as a prime dataset. If we emphasize that human languages may be 
signed, then ape gesture may seem equally relevant. But once one looks at manual gesture, one 
may return to monkeys to study manual action more generally. Similarly, one may look at 
modern languages in the richness of their aboutness, or one may instead focus simply on the 
ability to string words into sequences, and then emphasize mechanisms in the monkey brain 
that support sequential behavior. We espouse a comprehensive framework.  
Establishing the “Stages” 
What capabilities of brain, behavior and communication should define stages in our road 
map? We need to avoid being seduced by the metaphor of the evolutionary tree, for we now 
understand that extant species at one stage may evolve differentially yet continue to cross-
breed – and so at each stage we may establish a suite of capabilities that may have been 
distributed across different species and populations. What evolutionary principles could explain 
how the human brain might aggregate them? Moreover, primates in human captivity may 
acquire capacities never seen in the wild. To what extent does that imply they have the brain 
mechanisms to support that capacity but do not have the capability for the cultural evolution 
that them? 
Modern species did not evolve from each other. Thus, one challenge is to study various 
extant monkeys to extract a shared core (brain, behavior, communication) to define the LCA-m 
baseline. But what of traits seen in some monkey species that don’t meet our criteria for LCA-m 
and yet are shared by humans? Perhaps convergent evolution was involved. But if so, we must 
hypothesize where and how this property re-emerged. Examples: Vocal turn-taking in the 
marmoset does not seem to qualify as a property of LCA-m. One group of cebus (capuchin) 
monkeys exhibits tool use (using stones to crack palm nuts), other groups and other species do 
not. Burkart assesses how the former may provide insights into human social structure; the 
latter may be relevant for placing (proto)human stone tools (Stout and Putt) in an evolutionary 
context. 
Similarly, we need a fuller assessment of what properties of present-day great apes can 
plausibly be attributed to LCA-c or may offer suggestions for convergent evolution. 
In Search of Precise Terminology 
Another methodological challenge is that many of the terms that appear in this field have 
different meanings when applied to different species. Future work must refine the terminology 
to the point where we can address the questions: Which definition best characterizes the 
version seen in one species rather than another, and how does this license the version(s) 
posited for LCA-m, LCA-c and later? For version X, can we establish the properties of the X-
ready brain and the cultural conditions (if necessary) that support its expression? Then, when 
we note version X posited for one ancestral species and version Y posited for a later ancestral 
species, we must investigate: Is X a precursor of Y, or was it a terminological “coincidence” that 
X and Y are refinements of the same term? If we can establish that X is a precursor of Y, is an X-
ready brain also a Y-ready brain, with the evolution being primarily cultural? Or is a Y-ready 
brain different from an X-ready brain, so that biological as well as cultural evolution is involved? 
Note that these questions apply more generally. For example, while all would agree that an H. 
sapiens language-ready brain is a reading-ready brain, some may disagree with the view (as in 
MSH) that a protolanguage-ready brain is already language-ready. 
Here are four of the terms whose refinement is relevant to defining our road map: 
Imitation: Inspired in part by Byrne and Russon (1998), MSH distinguished very limited 
imitation (e.g., effector priming) in LCA-m, “simple” imitation in LCA-c and “complex” imitation 
in humans, but Myowa adds a new dimension to complex imitation – attention to emotional 
state as well as the performance of the skill. 
Pantomime: MSH defines a form of pantomime that builds on complex action recognition (a 
prerequisite of complex imitation) and posits that it evolved in the hominid line; Russon reports 
on pantomimes in orangutans and so posits pantomime as a component of LCA-c (her LCA-ga). 
Turn-taking: Burkart assesses turn-taking in callitrichids; Rossano presents three variants of 
turn-taking, suggesting that the one applicable to human language may not be a descendant of 
the callitrichid version (see also Wacewicz for a similar view). 
Episodic Memory: Corballis offers a wide range of capabilities (e.g., navigation in rats, recall 
of sites where food is cached by squirrels) as examples of the great ancestral depth of episodic 
memory; Pustejovsky sees the ability to conceptualize events, extracting them from the 
embodied flow of experience – recalling such events is the form of episodic memory underlying 
much of language use – as unique to humans. 
Beyond the Primates 
Parrots and some other birds have flexible vocal production and imitation, while dogs can 
acquire a large receptive (not productive) vocabulary for spoken commands; none of these 
appear to have grammar. Much is to be learned from studying such capabilities and their neural 
basis, but while such studies will usefully complement work on primates (Petkov & Jarvis, 
2012), these lie outside our present purview. 
The CNP-2018 Road Map 
Capabilities of LCA-m 
MSH: Manual dexterity with a related mirror neuron system supporting action recognition, 
but no capacity for “real” imitation. Integration of the mirror system with systems “beyond the 
mirror,” including a visual dorsal “how” pathway and ventral “planning” pathway for the reach-
to-grasp system. Serial behavior including opportunistic scheduling of actions.  
Coudé argues that more attention must be paid to the oro-facial mirror system. Whereas the 
manual system is related to parietal-premotor circuits, the oro-facial system connects with 
limbic structures. Exploring the linkage between these two systems could underpin efforts to 
chart evolution of the linkage between communication and emotions.  
Arbib 2 addresses the “aboutness” of language by suggesting that a system for linking visual 
perception of the current environment to a plan for manual action may be the precursor for a 
system of semantic representation in the language-ready brain. This notion needs to be 
assessed in relation to models of sequential behavior that set the baseline for Wilson’s 
exploration of their relevance to syntax. 
LCA-m is posited to have vocal communication (innate call repertoire) but (almost) no vocal 
learning and little importance for manual gesture. Where MSH posits (at later stages) that 
(manual) protosign provided the scaffolding for the evolution of flexible vocal control and 
learning, Aboitiz (without denying the importance of gesture) argues for a direct road in 
evolving speech, requiring more careful attention to the auditory system and precursors to 
vocal control in monkeys. He is particularly concerned with precursors of the form of working 
memory in humans called the phonological loop. Resolving the debate between the “vocal 
control first” and “semantics first” hypotheses is a major challenge. Corballis challenges us to 
assess what form of episodic memory LCA-m had: was it more than the ability to form a 
cognitive map? 
Capabilities of LCA-c 
LCA-m properties are conserved, but further capacities become available. 
MSH emphasizes simple imitation, attempting to use familiar manual actions to 
achieve recognizable goals and the use of gesture to communicate (but not to converse). 
Arbib 1 offers a model of how some of these could be learned by ontogenetic 
ritualization without dependence on imitation. For MSH, learnable gestures are on the 
path to language whereas primate calls are not (recall the debate on whether protosign 
provided essential scaffolding for the evolution of speech). 
The use of gestures shows that intentional communication is already established in 
LCA-c. The acquisition of human-demonstrated “symbols” by enculturated apes shows 
that LCA-c was symbol-ready, even though LCA-c “cultures” were not symbol-rich. In 
what sense are these symbols similar to those of humans, with their rich conceptual 
repertoire? 
Liebal challenges us to assess vocal calls and manual gestures in monkeys and great apes as 
a basis for better defining the evolutionary path (changes in brain and culture) that link them, 
and for grounding a more careful analysis of their links to emotion and intentionality. 
Semendeferi compares emotion-related structures in different great ape species assessing 
what they might offer in defining the LCA-c brain in contrast with the human brain to suggest 
that an expanded capacity for emotional processing could be linked to language readiness. 
Determining the relevant connections and assessing their role in linking emotion and 
communication remains a crucial challenge. Helping address this will be Coudé’s enrichment of 
the macaque mirror system database, and Hecht’s use of DTI to compare mirror neuron 
connectivity in macaque, chimpanzee and human. A further challenge is to relate this to 
comparative studies of language-related connectivity (Rilling, 2014) as differentially assessed by 
Aboitiz and Arbib 2. 
Russon presents pantomimes observed in great apes (especially orangutans) to argue for 
pantomime as a capacity of LCA-c (her LCA-ga). She observes that great ape pantomime does 
not rest on imitation, whereas MSH posits (next section) that complex action recognition and 
imitation evolved post LCA-c and prior to pantomime. Do her data invalidate the MSH claim or 
is this rather a challenge for terminological refinement? In either case, modeling brain 
mechanisms supporting these forms of pantomime will be crucial to assessing these social 
functions. 
Hominins prior to Homo sapiens 
MSH posits a sequence of five stages from LCA-c to language-ready Homo sapiens: 
The first combines complex action recognition, the ability to attend to the subgoals and 
some details of the constituent movements of an observed behavior, with complex 
imitation, the ability to use such recognition to acquire new skills. Second, pantomime 
emerges, based on complex action recognition (but perhaps not on imitation), 
supporting the creation of novel pantomimes “on the fly” and the ability of others to 
recognize them. This opens up semantics beyond the limited range offered by innate 
vocalizations and ape gestures. Third, frequently used pantomimes become conventionalized 
within groups to provide protosign. Fourth, early protosign constructed the niche for the 
emergence of sophisticated vocal learning and control, thus augmenting protosign with 
protospeech in an expanding spiral. Fifth comes protolanguage, the capacity to recognize 
classes of events and link them to “protowords,” whether signed or spoken. 
Clearly, each claim here offers challenges. We have already mentioned the debates over 
speech and pantomime. One may add the Corballis-Pustejovsky debate over when event 
perception became developed enough to support protolanguage, let alone the ability to 
converse about past and imagined events. Did the latter occur with early protolanguage, or did 
it await the emergence of language? 
But even were the above sequence correct, serious problems remain. Here are a few: 
Timeline: When did these substages occur? In australopithecines? Did H. habilis or H. erectus 
or yet uncharted forms of early Homo see the emergence of key innovations? Schoenemann 
assesses the data from endocasts but these provide weak constraints since we lack insights into 
what it really takes for a brain to support any of the above capabilities.  
Social structure: What social structure was necessary for the success of these innovations? 
Rossano offers a comparative view of different patterns of social interaction and 
communication that apes may exhibit. A major challenge then is to assess what combination of 
these were relevant to the evolution of language, and how they contributed to the “platform of 
trust” that Wacewicz sees as necessary for the success of (proto)language and the ability of 
children to acquire it – without denying the capacity of humans (shared with chimpanzees) to 
steal and violate that trust in diverse ways (Byrne & Whiten, 1988). 
Culture, more generally: Brains do not fossilize and the evidence from endocasts is limited. 
We have no record of language before the invention of writing a few thousand years ago. But 
we do have a profusion of stone tools and other artefacts. Stout and Putt combine instructing 
modern humans in Oldowan versus Acheulean stone knapping with brain imaging to 
hypothesize what might have changed in the parieto-frontal system to support these 
technologies. Stout assesses the pedagogy involved to calibrate forms of imitation and assess 
the level of (proto)language that might have been needed to support training in the relevant 
skills. For each form of culture, we must assess to what extent its evolution depended on the 
biological or cultural evolution of (proto)language, and to what extent it contributed to it. 
Seifert explores a possible relationship between the evolution of the language-ready brain and 
music-ready brain and raises questions as to what may be shared (could prosody be part of the 
overlap?) and what is distinctive. Here, again, we face the issue of what makes a brain “ready” 
for a domain of culture, and how cultural evolution may have exploited those resources.  
Post-Biological Evolution in Homo sapiens 
MSH holds that early Homo sapiens had protolanguages (diverse “protowords” with 
little or no grammar) in vocal and manual modalities, but not languages (with a grammar 
to support compositional semantics) – and that it was cultural evolution that underlay the 
transition via increasingly complex protolanguages to languages which in turn increased in 
complexity (there is no sharp boundary) along with increasing complexity of social structure. 
The ability to form protowords yielded to the ability to freely extend the lexicon and develop 
diverse constructions to support on-line production and comprehension of utterances which (in 
a possibly context-dependent way) convey new meanings. 
Arbib 2 discusses the challenge of assaying the relative plausibility of the Bickertonian 
version of protolanguage (with the transition to language adding “merge” to a set of words) 
and the MSH version (with the transition both fractionating protowords to yield constructions 
and words and building from there). Dubreuil and Henshilwood alert us to the challenge of 
placing the transition in the hominid timeline, but our road map holds that the transition was 
gradual, with no clear break between complex protolanguages and simple languages. 
Wilson compares monkey and human brains to suggest how sequence processing in LCA-m 
might have survived as the core of syntax as assayed by the learning of artificial grammars. But 
how do artificial grammars relate to meaningful conversation? Neurolinguists have no pre-
eminent theory of grammar whose operation in the brain they agree to study. The only 
candidate offered in this special issue is Template Construction Grammar (Arbib 2), but there is 
no reason to expect it to survive as more than a crude approximation. 
Volterra offers insights into the aboutness of language by investigating the 
progression from actions to gestures to words in the young child and the emergence of 
cross-modal (gesture word) combinations, although further investigation is required about the 
further development of grammar. Here we return to the crucial DevoSocio challenge of 
understanding the evolution of brains that not only support the human child’s ability to 
learn a language but also the caregiver’s ability to assist the process. Stout’s notion of 
technological pedagogy, linking acquisition of technical skill with imitation and 
instruction may prove helpful. 
Sinha presents three “spheres” that together provide the setting for modern humans: 
the sphere of infancy and childhood, including learning and teaching; the technosphere of 
praxis and its products; and the semiosphere of communication and its mediating signs. The 
preceding pages offer pieces of the road map relevant to these spheres, and sets the grand 
challenge of not only providing each of them with a testable evolutionary scenario rooted in 
(computational) comparative neuroprimatology but also exploring their mutual dependencies 
during their evolutionary progressions, both biological and cultural. 
Surveying artifacts from the last 100,000 years, one can seek to assess the cognitive 
capacities required for constructing shelters, for burial practices and for cave art – and then 
debate whether language was necessary for the development and transmittal of these cultural 
practices, or whether protolanguage or “mere” imitation would have sufficed. A thoughtful 
cautionary note is provided by Dubreuil and Henshilwood (2013) who survey a range of 
archeological evidence to conclude (p.257) that Language readiness results from a combination of several neurocognitive mechanisms, often independent of one another. The absence of one of these mechanisms may not have prevented the evolution of language, but may have led to the evolution of impoverished forms of language. The most likely scenario, in our view, is that the brain was almost language-ready significantly before Homo sapiens and that the cultural evolution of languages was well underway when the first sapiens evolved. This is not to say, however, that Homo erectus and Homo heidelbergensis were speaking languages totally akin to ours. Limitations in perspective-taking and mind-reading abilities might have prevented some features of modern human languages from evolving, such as metalinguistic awareness, irony, and potentially some complex syntactical structures. 
Envoi 
The current road map cannot do justice to the richness of research in the diverse disciplines 
that it touches upon. Somewhat humblingly, one may note that Jon Kaas has recently published 
the second edition of Evolution of Nervous Systems (Kaas, 2017) in four volumes, with Volume 
3, The Nervous Systems of Non-Human Primates, and Volume 4, The Evolution of The Human 
Brain: Apes and Other Ancestors, providing but a small part of the treasure trove to be 
exploited in building on the sample provided here. Meanwhile, we invite readers to explore the 
selected treasures in the 21 preceding papers in this special issue. Each concludes with a 
section “Towards a New Road Map.” Their totality offers far more detail than the Road Map 
presented here – the one towards which the others are pointing – but the present paper offers 
a more integrated view than the others can provide. It is our hope that the CNP-2018 Road Map 
will not be the last, and we would welcome suggestions on how it might be enriched in future 
editions. Those sent to Michael Arbib (arbib@usc.edu) may, after editing and with your 
permission, be posted on ResearchGate as part of his Project at 
https://www.researchgate.net/project/Evolution-of-the-language-ready-brain. 
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